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PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
OWNERSHIP OF BEDS OF NAVIGABLE WATERS

It is in the nature of a civil law system to establish classifications and to provide general principles in the basic texts of
law, leaving to the courts the function and the duty of determining the application of the principles in relation to the fundamental classifications and in the furtherance of the best interests
of society (public policy). From time to time, an extremely
important issue strikes this incompletely charted area of the
law, creating doubt and disagreement as to the proper solution.
About two decades ago, this happened in the Erwin' and Miami2
cases, when it had to be decided whether Civil Code Articles
509 and 510-concerning accretion and dereliction-applied to
"lakes," and whether the bed of a navigable lake could be
vested in private ownership. The process was not without pain
and suffering, but it can be said that the final outcome in the
Miami decision was consistent with the basic classifications and
general principles of the law, and in conformity with the public policy of the state.
Another such question has returned to plague the bodylegal involving the possibility of private ownership of the bed
of a navigable water. In 1953, the Humble case 3 resulted in the
protection of the private ownership of the bed of a navigable
water known as Duck Lake, the decision being based upon
the interpretation of a so-called "statute of repose"-Act 62
of 1912. In the following 1954 term of court, the same issue
came up with reference to the private ownership of the bed
of another body of navigable water-Grand Bay-and the decision went the same way in this case of California Company v.
4

Price.

Grand Bay is admittedly a navigable body of water, but
the area. involved was included within the description of a
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
2. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
3. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.

State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64

So.2d 839 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 267. See also The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1958 Term-Property, 14 LOUISIANA
LAw Rsvisw 133 (1953).
4. 74 So.2d 1 (La. 1954), 15 LOUIsIANA LAw REVIEW 463 (1955).
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much larger area in a patent which the state had issued in 1874
to a private individual. Act 62 of 19125 provided that ". . . all
suits . . .to vacate and annul any patent issued by the State
of Louisiana- . . or any transfer of property by any subdivision
of the State, shall be brought only within six years. . . ." On

the basis of this statute, the court rejected the state's claim to
the bed as being an inalienable thing because it is insusceptible of private ownership. The area involved was within the
description of the patent and the time to contest its validity
had run out on the state.
Six opinions were written for the California case, replete
with technical arguments and counter-arguments. It would be
redundant to keep repeating them again, and it would not serve
a useful purpose to try picking out individual issues for logical
evaluation or criticism. Neither would it appear to be fruitful
at this time to insist upon clarification and separation of the
different ideas which may be involved in the sometimes interchangeable terms of "peremption" and "prescription" and "statute of repose." Another issue would concern the "arm of the
sea" point. Still another potential issue would be the separate
identification and classification of "common things" and "public
things" instead of treating them as the same in a compound
phrase "common and public things." The issue on which the
case was decided was the "intent of the legislature" which
passed Act 62 of 1912, and since they said "any patent.., or any
transfer of property" it was held that the statute must be given
effect.
At this time, only one point will be stressed. It is a mild
understatement to say that the Humble and California cases
focused on an issue of statutory interpretation about which
there was great doubt and serious uncertainty. Of the six different opinions written in the California case, three are dissents.
In the light of these facts, it cannot be denied that either one
solution or the other could be sustained by reasonably adequate legal argument-especially since the so-called intent of
the 1912 legislature is necessarily an imputed intent formulated
by people here and now about what may or may not have been
in the minds of other people more than forty years ago. Under
such circumstances, the decision of the case should have been
in conformity with the public policy of the state, that is, to
5. LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950).
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sustain the inalienability by the state of the beds of navigable
waters because they are insusceptible of private ownership.
The combination of the Humble and the California cases
evoked legislative reaction in the 1954 regular session. Two
acts, 6 aimed directly at these decisions, purport to override their
holding. Act 727 declares that "all navigable waters and the
beds of same ... are common or public things and insusceptible

of private ownership." Even though common things and public
things are to be distinguished on other grounds, and it may be
regrettable to have the two terms used as if they were synonymous, they do have the same significance which this context
specifically identifies as being insusceptible of private ownership. Insofar as this statute goes further to declare that the
intent of the 1912 legislature, in its Act No. 62, was to limit its
scope to patents or transfers of land susceptible of private ownership, it is performing the same operation that the court used
in imputing a legislative intent of which there is no direct evidence. When, in turn, the court gets to interpret the 1954 statutes, the question may well be whether it is the court or the
legislature that has the superior authority to declare 7which
intent is to be read into the texts of prior legislatures.
SERVITUDES

Land bordering on navigable rivers is subject to a number
of servitudes, one of which is to allow space for a public road.8
The interpretation and scope of this servitude is the subject of
decision in the case of Hebert v. T. L. James & Co.) The State
Highway Commission started to widen an old 30-foot road into
a 75-foot servitude, and the proprietor obtained an injunction
claiming a right to compensation for the additional land. With a
historical outline of the development of river roads, Justice Hamiter shows that this servitude "was not intended to serve the public for any purpose other than that which is incident to the
nature, navigable character, or use of the stream. ' 10 The construction of a new wide highway may be in the general public
6. La. Acts 1954, No. 727, LA. R.S. 9:1107-1109 (Supp. 1954); La. Acts
1954, No. 443, LA. R.S. 9:1101 (Supp. 1954).

See Hebert & Lazarus, Legisli-

tion Affecting the Cfv4l Code, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 21 (1954).
7. That the court would defer to the expressed statements of the
legislature might be inferred from the court's reference in some cases, e.g.,
Cassiere v. Cuban Coffee Mills, 74 So.2d 193, 197 (1954), that the absence
of legislative expression after a court's decision is treated as an assumption of approval-implying at the same time an authority to disapprove.
8. Arts. 665, 707, LA. CrvM CODE of 1870.
9. 224 La. 498, 70 So.2d 102 (1953).
10. Id. at 508, 70 So.2d at 106.
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interest of improved and safer vehicular travel, but the land
needed must be expropriated with compensation in the regular
manner, and cannot simply be taken without compensation as
within the river road servitude.
The servitude on riparian property for levee purposes and
flood control 1 is no longer, in itself, the subject of many disputes; however, there still recur questions as to its scope and
the extent of its exercise. In Board of Levee Commissioners of
Orleans Levee District v. Kelly, 12 the Levee Board and the
United States Army Engineers were preparing to carry out an
approved levee project, and they wanted to remove certain
structures and dwellings located on the batture along the Mississippi River. Even though some portions of the work could
have been executed without removal of the buildings, this
would have hampered and delayed the achievement of the
program, besides risking the loss of available federal funds.
In affirming the lower court's injunction ordering removal,
it was held that this request was within a reasonable exercise
of the servitude. Although the batture dwellers in this case were
not riparian owners and had no semblance of any legal right
to reside there, the test of the manner in which the levee servitude is exercised in any case would still be one of reasonableness under the circumstances, and that private interests must
yield to reasonable demands of public necessity and economy. 18
While this may make for individualization of judicial examination of facts, it does insure against arbitrary or unreasonable
action by a levee board.
DEDICATION

The dedication of streets within a municipality can be either
express or tacit, and the formal or statutory express dedication
of a street in a certain location does not preclude the possibility
of a public street being established by tacit dedication at a different location on the same property. In B. F. Trappey's Sons, Inc.
v. City of New Iberia,1 4 a street had been opened across plaintiff's property as a by-pass while an adjacent regular street was
being paved. This was in use before and continued to be used
after the formal dedication at a different location; the plaintiff
asserted this formal dedication as a bar to the existence of
11.
12.
13.
14.

Art. 665, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.

225 La. 411, 73 So.2d 299 (1954).
73 So.2d at 302; cf. Pruyn v. Nelson, 180 La. 760, 157 So. 585 (1934).
225 La. 466, 73 So.2d 423 (1954).
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any tacit dedication of the street in question. However, in the
presence of the three necessary elements: (1) use by the public, (2) maintenance by the municipality, and (3) acquiescence
(consent) of the proprietor, there was held to be a tacit dedication. Despite the logic and reasoning, it is not hard to understand the plaintiff's displeasure when, in addition to all that
had already happened, he found paving liens and assessments
recorded against his property for the further improvement of
this street. Nevertheless, even if it is unavoidable to heap all
these misfortunes upon the poor proprietor, is it also necessary
to inflict upon our civil law the description of an implied dedication in terms of a common law "estoppel in pais"?
In Mecobon v. Police Jury 5 an alleged dedication failed
for lack of evidence concerning intent to dedicate, and because
there did not appear to be such a use for public purposes as
would exclude the idea of private ownership.
In addition to the property cases here discussed, there were
a number of cases on expropriation, 16 which is treated in the
Civil Code as a forced sale rather than as a property matter.
The dispute usually centers on either the extent and value of
the land to be taken, the location of the right of way, or, most
frequently, the amount of compensation. Another group of
cases "8' concerning land involve problems which derive from tax
sales.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
HarrietS. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS

In Bierhorst v. Kelly" the court held that Articles 76, 77, 78,
and 79, dealing with rights falling to an absentee after he de15. 224 La. 793, 70 So.2d 687 (1954).
16. City of Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 223 La. 1079, 67 So.2d 732
(1953); Louisiana Rural Electric Corp. v. Guillory, 224 La. 73, 68 So.2d 762
(1953); Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. Watson, 224 La. 136, 68
So.2d 901 (1953); Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Brinkman, 224 La.
262, 69 So.2d 37 (1953); Calcasieu & S. Ry. v. Bel, 224 La. 269, 69 So.2d 40
(1953); Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71
So.2d 541 (1954).
17. Art. 2626 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
18. New Orleans v. Doll, 224 La. 1046, 71 So.2d 562 (1954); Cortinas v.
Murray, 224 La. 686, 70 So.2d 589 (1954); Housing Authority of New Orleans
v. Banks, 224 La. 172, 69 So.2d 5 (1953); Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines
Drainage Dist., 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d 774 (1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 168 (La. 1954).

